UMBERTO CASADEI 'RUMBA' APONTA O DEDO A MAPUTO, TAL COMO GRAÇA MACHEL

quarta-feira, 29 de maio de 2019

OME DE GUERRA: "RUMBA"

UMBERTO CASADEI 'RUMBA' APONTA O DEDO A MAPUTO, TAL COMO GRAÇA MACHEL

QUEM SÃO OS DOIS GENERAIS CITADOS NOS TEXTOS?

O acidente aéreo que em 1986 vitimou o Presidente Samora Machel terá sido comandado de Maputo, acusa o advogado italo-moçambicano Umberto Casadei, que trabalhou desde 1970 para os serviços de contra-espionagem da Frelimo.

«Eu descobri, com base nas revelações de um soviético, como tinha sido possível, tecnicamente, ao operador das ajudas de terra à navegação aérea tornar (aquelas) ineficientes, sem deixar qualquer rasto e sem sequer o controlador da torre se aperceber disso», afirmou Casadei, numa entrevista publicada  em Maputo pelo diário «Imparcial». «Adverti todas as entidades interessadas, mas ninguém quis ouvir-me, o que me deixou com a clara sensação de que eles sabiam muito mais do que eu, mas o que queriam é que eu ficasse bem calado e tranquilo», acrescentou.

Machel e a sua comitiva, bem como a tripulação soviética, perderam a vida na noite de 19 de Outubro de 1986, quando o Tupolev em que viajavam no regresso de uma cimeira em Lusaca, embateu contra uma montanha em Mbuzini, na província sul-africana do Transvaal.
Apesar de a comissão internacional de inquérito ter declarado não haver provas de que o acidente fora provocado, as autoridades moçambicanas persistiram na suspeita de que os sul-africanos tinham programado a morte de Machel, interferindo no sistema de orientação da aeronave. A versão oficial nunca teve a aprovação da viúva, Graça Machel.
Umberto Casadei decidiu fazer estas revelações pouco antes do seu regresso a Itália. Ao fim de um quarto de século de colaboração com a Frelimo, o ex-agente diz-se amargurado com as injustiças que alegadamente sofreu em Moçambique.

Extracto Do Livro 'Days Of The Generals'

Testemunho De Umberto Casadei E A Investigação Da Jornalista Debora Patta (Radio 702, Da África Do Sul)

A Case of Assassination? President Samora Machel and the Plane Crash at Mbuzini. O papel de
CHIPANDE, CHISSANO, GUEBUZA, MATSINHE, MABOTE

 by David Alexander Robinson

(...) Far more startling and significant, however, was Patta’s assertion that she had interviewed one of Machel’s close confidants, a well-known Italian resident of Maputo named Casadei, who claimed that he had stumbled on a plot by South African and Mozambican agents to kill the President. 

According to Patta, those  on  the  Mozambican  side  had  offered  their  support  for  the  plot  in  exchange  for assistance in gaining power, while the South Africans would oversee the technical aspects of the operation. Casadei said that he informed Machel of the identities of two Mozambican Generals who were involved in the plot, but the President refused to take action against them. 

Patta  also  maintained  that  she  had  viewed  an  intelligence  document  that  named  South African, Mozambican and Malawian agents involved in the plot.9  Then in January 2003 it was reported by the Sowetan Sunday World that a former Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) agent serving  a 28-year  term in Baviaanspoort  Prison near Pretoria,  a Namibian  national named Hans Louw, claimed he was involved in Samora Machel’s death. 

According to Louw, military intelligence operatives positioned a false airport beacon to lure the plane off-course and he was part of a clean-up team that would ensure the President had died. As it turned out his team was never activated. A former Rhodesian Selous Scout operative, Edwin Mudingi, claimed to have been part of the same operation and confirmed Louw’s involvement. 

Louw also confessed to a number of other crimes, including a similar operation that used a VOR beacon to lure an Angolan  military plane off course in 1989 and killed a number of key Angolan military figures. Only a few months later, on 6 April 2003, the Sowetan Sunday World reported  that  former  Chief  of  South  African  Military  Intelligence,  General  Pieter ‘Tienie’ Groenewald, admitted in an interview with journalist Mpikelani Duma that Samora Machel’s plane had been brought down by a false navigational beacon. According to Joseph Hanlon, the article disclosed that,  Groenewald also claimed that senior Frelimo officials were involved in the killing, and that senior ‘individuals and [then Foreign Minister Joaquim] Chissano were appraised of the details of the plot to kill Machel’.

 Though the article provoked furious denials from members of the Frelimo leadership, veteran Mozambique analyst Hanlon’s assessment was that the allegations could not be so easily dismissed, especially since,  Groenewald only said that Chissano knew of the plan, not that he organised it or was in contact with South Africa… [and] Samora Machel's widow, Graca Machel, now the wife  of  Nelson  Mandela,  has  publicly  accused  Mozambican  ‘generals’  of  being involved in the assassination.(...)

 VOLTEMOS A CASADEI

CASADEI ESCAPA EM TRÊS ATENTADOS A TIRO EM MAPUTO AO DESAFIAR O CLÃ GUEBUZA

O advogado tornara-se uma espécie de estrela mediática, ao escapar com vida a três atentados à bala. Na altura, Casadei atribuiu os ataques a colaboradores do empresário António Baessa Pinto, então a monte. Em 1993, um tribunal de Maputo indigitou Casadei como gestor do Grupo Pinto, proprietário de uma dezena de restaurantes, cafés e discotecas, em Maputo, e acusado de burla por um banco. Mas constava que Pinto agia como simples figura de fachada do seu tio Armando Guebuza, um dos homens mais poderosos de Moçambique e líder parlamentar da Frelimo, e entretanto tornado presidente do país.
Nascido em Itália numa família comunista, Casadei começou a colaborar com a Frelimo em 1970. Logrou infiltrar-se nos serviços de segurança da Rodésia de Ian Smith, o que lhe permitiu prestar grandes serviços aos guerrilheiros moçambicanos, como, por exemplo, a informação de que o Exército português estava a preparar a célebre operação «Nó Górdio».
José Pinto de Sá , em Maputo

 E  CASADEI VOLTA A ESCAPAR À MORTE EM ITÁLIA:
07 AGOSTO 2001. BOMBA DESTINADA A CASADEI FAZ UM FERIDO EM ITÁLIA

Ferito un operaio. L'uomo, autore di un articolo in cui raccontava di aver uccido dei fascisti, aveva respinto la busta Forlì, esplode pacco bomba destinato a un ex partigiano
FORLI' - Un pacco bomba è esploso ieri sera in una ditta di spedizioni, la Sda Express Courier, a Forlì mentre un operaio lo stava maneggiando. L'uomo, Rubens Gardelli, 23 anni, è rimasto ferito a un timpano ed è stato trasportato all'ospedale mentre un altro operaio, Paolo Pisu, 28 anni, che si trovava con lui, illeso ma cardiopatico, è stato ricoverato per accertamenti. Entrambi sono stati già dimessi e per ora non ci sono state rivendicazioni.
Il pacco bomba, che poteva uccidere o quantomeno provocare gravi danni, era destinato a Umberto Fusaroli Casadei, 72 anni, ex partigiano noto alle cronache per avere scritto nel maggio scorso a un quotidiano dicendo di aver ucciso fascisti nel dopoguerra. Casadei aveva rifiutato la consegna del pacco perchè gli erano stati chiesti due milioni per il pagamento.

MAS QUEM É UMBERTO FUSAROLI CASADEI?

LUNEDÌ 1 OTTOBRE 2007 - Stefio sotto accusa. Ed il partigiano "Rumba" ? IN  SANTOSEPOLCRO1.BLOGSPOT.PT

Venerdì ho scritto sul rinvio a giudizio di Stefio. Ci ritorno perchè mi è venuto in mente il caso del partigiano "Rumba", deceduto il 19 Settembre in un incidente stradale in provincia di Forlì.

Umberto Fusaroli Casadei, questo era il vero nome di "Rumba", 81enne tornato negli ultimi anni a far parlare di sè per alcune sue lettere od interviste su alcuni quotidiani, dalla Stampa al Giornale. Proprio l' articolo di Stefano Zurlo del Giornale del 2002 è illuminante. Nell' intervista il simpatico vecchietto ricorda alcuni episodi della sua guerra partigiana. Come quando uccise a sangue freddo un Ufficiale Tedesco arrivato a parlamentare con tanto di bandiera bianca. Pum, Pum, due colpi in testa, e via. Senza alcun rimorso, nè allora nè oggi. Centinaia le persone che ammazzò, "Nel periodo della guerra e anche dopo”. Alla domanda di Zurlo:"E lei non si commosse mai?  Mai un momento di esitazione ?", così rispose il bravo partigiano: “Mai. Nemmeno davanti alle donne”. Come per la Strage di Schio, dove a morire furono parecchie. In seguito, poi, davanti ad un Magistrato, Rumba negherà la partecipazione a quella pagina vergognosa della Storia Italiana:

"Lasciai il compagno Piastrina a custodia del camion, fuori mano, e raggiunsi il carcere. Portavo una giacca con i gradi da colonnello, prestatami dal comandante che era rimasto altrove, per precostituirsi un alibi. Per rendermi meno riconoscibile mi ero oscurato la faccia con una speciale tinta usata dagli inglesi nelle operazioni notturne. Indossavo inoltre un copricapo e un fazzoletto rosso al viso. Mi accorsi che gli altri erano già entrati, in anticipo sui tempi stabiliti. Così penetrai all'interno: c'era il caos. Partigiani che vagavano senza sapere bene cosa fare, i prigionieri radunati in uno stanzone. Occorreva accelerare i tempi, c'era il rischio che qualcuno desse l'allarme. Allora mi rivolsi a quelle persone ammassate: "C'è qualche prigioniero comune? Nessuno rispose. Diedi l'ordine di aprire il fuoco. Svuotai tre caricatori sparando con uno Sten in una babele di urla, strepiti, lacrime. I proiettili saettavano da tutte le parti, rimbalzavano sul pavimento, tornavano indietro. Fui colpito più volte di rimbalzo alle gambe, senza altro danno che leggere striature rossastre, larghe come una moneta d'argento del tempo. La permanenza si faceva troppo pericolosa e altri partigiani entravano sparando raffiche all'impazzata. Era saltata la luce, non si distinguevano nemmeno più le vittime da noi che le colpivamo. Uscii”.

Ebbene, qualche anno più tardi, Umberto Fusaroli Casadei sarà in Africa, in Mozambico, al fianco di Samora Moisés Machel, a combattere nella guerriglia antiportoghese comunista. Come si definiva lui, "combattente contro il colonialismo in Africa.".

Nonostante sia rientrato negli anni '90 in Italia, aderendo a Rifondazione Comunista per poi uscirne, Rumba non è mai stato indagato per l' Art. 288 CP.


JUNHO 1998 - O REGRESSO A ITÁLIA - DADOS SOBRE A MORTE DE MACHEL
La storia Licenza di uccidere - Stanco, dopo le molte guerre d'indipendenza combattute in Africa, Umberto, a 72 anni, è tornato a casa. Col segreto sulla morte di un capo di Stato...
di Pietro Veronese

Il vecchio rivoluzionario è tornato a casa con più anni, più delusioni e un cupo segreto, la chiave di un grande mistero africano: la morte violenta di un presidente.
"Non è un segreto", dice lui, scaldandosi e ricordando che lo ha gridato ai quattro venti, laggiù, solo che nessuno ha voluto ascoltarlo.
A 72 anni Umberto Fusaroli Casadei non è un uomo facile da raccontare. Ha vissuto almeno due vite, una in Italia, da partigiano, l'altra a sud dell'Equatore, tra guerriglie e rivoluzioni africane.
La prima cosa che fa vedere di sé è il monumento ai Caduti per la Libertà di Bertinoro (Forlì). Sul cippo di pietra bianca ci sono i nomi di suo padre Antonio, dello zio Gaetano e di altri familiari e compagni partigiani massacrati dai nazifascisti il primo maggio del '44.
Umberto aveva allora diciott'anni e diventò a sua volta un cacciatore di fascisti. Combatté nell'ottava Brigata Garibaldi e poi nella 29esima Gap, fu promosso comandante di compagnia. "Quando prendemmo Forlì, e poi nei mesi successivi, ne uccisi a centinaia", rievoca sgranando gli occhi, dietro i quali si stenta a vedere il giustiziere. Non ha pudore a rivendicare che per lui la guerra non finì il 25 aprile del '45.
La caccia ai fascisti continuò, anche dopo la Liberazione. E continuò l'attività clandestina, che doveva far sorgere in Italia il Sol dell'avvenire e invece tramontò in un dedalo di guai giudiziari. Ma lui risorse e partì per la sua seconda vita.
Nel '70, con la moglie Marisa, arrivò nell'Africa dei movimenti di liberazione e delle nuove indipendenze. Divenne confidente e consigliere di giovani africani rivoluzionari come lui, ricchi di idee e poveri di quattrini.
A Dar es Salaam, la capitale della Tanzania che era all'epoca rifugio di tutti i fuorusciti dell'Africa nera, la Marisa prese in gestione la mensa della Raffineria dove quegli smunti idealisti, paganti o no, trovavano comunque da mangiare. Così nascono le grandi amicizie.
Passò qualche anno, i ragazzi affamati di Dar es Salaam combatterono e vinsero, divennero i leader dei loro Paesi e Umberto si ritrovò amico di presidenti e primi ministri. Più di ogni altro, di Samora Machel, carismatico capo della guerriglia mozambicana e, dal '75, capo di Stato.
Fu da lui che Umberto e Marisa si trasferirono: a Maputo, la capitale del Mozambico abbandonata dai portoghesi. Una delle più belle città dell'Africa, affacciata sull'Oceano Indiano e - così pareva allora - sull'avvenire.
Ma la sera del 19 ottobre 1986, il bireattore Tupolev sul quale viaggiava il presidente mozambicano si schiantò al suolo disintegrandosi in mille schegge di metallo. Il luogo della catastrofe si trovava 35 miglia nautiche (65 chilometri) a ovest dell'aeroporto di Maputo, verso il quale l'aereo era diretto, e 150 metri all'interno della frontiera sudafricana.
Dieci anni dopo, su quella stessa collina, si è svolta una breve cerimonia per scoprire un monumento alla memoria. Un tumulo di mattoni sul quale si leggono i nomi delle vittime e poi: "Samora Machel, architetto dell'indipendenza nazionale, fondatore della Repubblica popolare del Mozambico, eroe dell'Africa, vivo in ciascuno di noi". A inaugurarlo è venuto il presidente del Sudafrica, Nelson Mandela. E con lui, ormai divorziato dalla moglie Winnie, la sua nuova compagna: Graça Machel, la vedova di Samora.
"Gli assassini avevano previsto tutto", ride Umberto Casadei. "Tutto, meno che questo amore".
Quando il presidente del Mozambico volò incontro alla morte una notte di dodici anni fa, non c'era tra Sudafrica e Mozambico amore alcuno. Tutto opponeva allora i due paesi: regimi, ideologie, alleanze. Gli accordi di pace firmati due anni e mezzo prima erano stati più volte violati dai sudafricani e Samora lo aveva denunciato. Il pensiero istintivo, appena si seppe che l'aereo era precipitato, fu: sono stati loro. Si disse che su quell'altura i servizi del Sudafrica avevano installato un potente radiofaro, per attirare il Tupolev sulla rotta sbagliata. Questa ipotesi aveva un solo difetto: non c'erano prove. Le due commissioni d'inchiesta scartarono entrambe la pista del falso radiofaro.
La prima giunse alla conclusione che la responsabilità dell'incidente era dell'equipaggio, di nazionalità sovietica, il quale "aveva ignorato tutte le procedure regolamentari". Il pilota e i suoi uomini commisero in verità una serie di errori madornali, senza i quali probabilmente Samora Machel si sarebbe salvato. Da bravi russi non avevano lesinato le birre, e quando si trovarono nell'emergenza non seppero reagire. Malgrado dubbi, perplessità e domande rimaste senza risposta, questa fu la versione comunemente accettata sul disastro. Non da tutti, però. Graça Machel non l'accettò mai. Chiusa nella sua casa e nel suo lutto, sapeva che c'era, da qualche parte, un'altra verità. Suo marito aveva molti nemici non solo nel governo del Sudafrica, ma anche in quello del Mozambico.
Avversari politici, avversari soprattutto sulla questione morale, che nel credo personale di Machel era il comandamento numero uno. Samora morì povero. Narra la leggenda che poco prima della fine, mosso da un presentimento, chiamò il suo segretario per farsi dare l'elenco degli oggetti ricevuti in dono dai dignitari stranieri. Alcuni erano ufficiali e dovevano restare alla Repubblica; altri personali e il presidente li voleva, per avere qualcosa da lasciare alla famiglia.
Graça Machel contattò i rivoluzionari del Sudafrica molto prima del giorno in cui diventò chiaro che presto anche loro sarebbero arrivati al potere. Gli chiese l'impegno a riaprire il dossier sulla morte di Samora, a far luce sull'eventuale responsabilità del regime bianco sudafricano. L'impegno divenne promessa personale quando Graça diventò la compagna di Mandela. Il nuovo governo sudafricano ha istituito già da tempo una Unità investigativa speciale che ha appunto il compito di indagare e raccogliere prove sui crimini del passato regime.
La Special Investigative Unit è guidata da un giovane sostituto procuratore, si chiama Torie Pretorius, è un bianco e ha meno di quaranta anni. È stato lui a riaprire nel maggio scorso le indagini sulla catastrofe aerea nella quale morì Samora Machel. Gli indizi che ha raccolto sul coinvolgimento sudafricano sono tantissimi. È saltato fuori anche il nome in codice dell'operazione: "Icarus", come il personaggio della mitologia greca che provò a volare, ma precipitò in mare. Nulla di più appropriato.
Lo schema è proprio quello che s'era sospettato fin dall'inizio: un falso radiofaro in grado di emettere un segnale identico a quello dell'aeroporto di Maputo e di dirottare il Tupolev verso la sua fine. A questa teoria manca però un tassello fondamentale. Per convincere pilota e navigatore dell'aereo presidenziale che il segnale del falso radiofaro era quello vero, non bastava imitare quello emesso sulla frequenza di Maputo. Bisognava anche che Maputo non trasmettesse: altrimenti i segnali sarebbero stati due. Ci volevano dei complici nella torre di controllo mozambicana. Pronti a spegnere il loro radiofaro nell'attimo in cui l'altro avrebbe iniziato a funzionare.

È qui che s'inserisce la testimonianza di Casadei. Nel 1982 il companheiro Umberto viene interpellato da un altro italiano residente a Maputo, proprietario di un'impresa edile. Conoscendo la sua intimità col presidente, gli propone di farsi assoldare dai servizi segreti sudafricani. Casadei riferisce a Samora e gli chiede: "Che faccio? L'ammazzo?".
Machel gli ferma la mano. "Il Mozambico è un colabrodo per i servizi sudafricani", ragiona, "questa è la nostra occasione di rendere la pariglia". E convince l'amico ad accettare la proposta e a diventare, per 600 rand al mese (all'epoca più o meno mezzo milione di lire), informatore del Sudafrica. In realtà, Umberto fa il doppio gioco. Il primo incontro avviene a Gaborone, nel Botswana, in un ristorante fuori città. Il suo contatto è una bella bruna che si fa chiamare Maureen, ha anche un cognome e una casella postale.
Il nuovo "lavoro" di Umberto Casadei - che a Maputo, come a Dar es Salaam, ha aperto un ristorante - diventa routine. "I 600 rand li consegnavo al ministero della Sicurezza, in cambio di regolare ricevuta. Ma presto mi accorsi che al ministero non facevano alcun uso dei miei rapporti. Così cominciai a riferire direttamente a Samora". Quello che Maureen gli disse in uno dei loro incontri a Pretoria, circa un anno prima della morte del presidente, Umberto non lo avrebbe mai messo per iscritto. Lei gli chiese che ne pensasse di due generali mozambicani, uno altissimo responsabile delle Forze armate, l'altro politico rampante (tutt'oggi in posizione di grande potere). Umberto volle sapere la ragione della domanda e Maureen: "Ci hanno contattato. Dicono che sono in grado di eliminare il presidente ma hanno paura del dopo, di trovarsi isolati di fronte a una reazione favorevole a Samora. Perciò, se vogliamo che agiscano, chiedono da noi aiuto e copertura".
Ancora una volta il compagno Casadei si precipita da Machel e invoca da lui licenza di uccidere. Ancora una volta l'altro lo ferma: "Se muoiono, si capirà subito che tu hai parlato, sarai bruciato. Aspetta, li prenderemo in trappola". Adesso sappiamo come andò a finire. Secondo Umberto Fusaroli Casadei, dunque, non furono i sudafricani a uccidere Samora Machel. Fu un complotto mozambicano-sudafricano, di cui facevano parte alti responsabili del regime di Maputo.
Altro che equipaggio sovietico ubriaco (fatto del resto smentito dalla relazione della seconda commissione d'inchiesta, quella ufficiale, basata sulle autopsie). Questo spiega perché, quella notte, non c'erano due radiofari, ma uno solo, nel posto sbagliato. Perché anche il potente radar militare della base aerea accanto all'aeroporto, quella sera, era misteriosamente spento. Perché il controllore di volo, invece di dare istruzioni chiare e forti via radio all'equipaggio smarrito, aggiunse confusione a confusione. Perché certi ministri, all'ultimo momento, rifiutarono di salire sull'aereo presidenziale (altri andarono e vi trovarono la morte).

"In Mozambico, a quell'epoca, Samora ordinava e nessuno obbediva", ricorda Casadei. "A Maputo era il caos, l'aeroporto un manicomio, lo so bene io che ci stavo tutti i giorni. Era una porta aperta. La corruzione imperava, tutto aveva un prezzo. Facevano traffico d'armi nei gabinetti, era una centrale di contrabbando. Vidi bene le cose strane di quella notte fatale e iniziai subito a esprimere i miei dubbi ad alta voce". Troppo alta, forse. Le denunce, i memoriali, gli articoli sui giornali cominciarono ad attirargli guai.

È stato dopo il secondo tentativo d'omicidio che Umberto Casadei ha deciso che Maputo era diventata una città troppo calda per lui. Se n'è tornato in Italia con le sue carte e l'amarezza di vedere un'altra rivoluzione tradita. Anche lui, forse, aveva pensato a tutto meno alla possibilità di riporre le sue ultime speranze in un magistrato sudafricano, bianco, per niente di sinistra, solo uomo di legge. A lui ha riferito nomi, cognomi, tutto quello che sapeva. Adesso aspetta di vedere fin dove arriverà la verità.


Ho incontrato Umberto Fusaroli Casadei in 2 occasioni...
Submitted by Lorenzo (non verificato) on Mar, 20/04/2010 - 23:18.
Ho incontrato Umberto Fusaroli Casadei in due occasioni: la prima, nel 1976, quando ancora ragazzino di 7 anni andavo in giro per le strade di Maputo con mio fratello a sparare ai passeri con la carabina ad aria compressa... quella mattina eravamo in Avenida Kenneth Kaunda, una macchina ci vede, inchioda in uno stridere di pneumatici assordante, ne scende furibondo l'autista, ci acchiappa ambedue per un braccio, strattonandoci ci sbatte in macchina ed insultandoci ci dice che adesso aveva capito chi faceva strage di uccelletti in giro per Maputo (con mio fratello, mai riusciti a centrare un passero in mesi e mesi di tentativi, aimé!!). Noi piangiamo, gli chiediamo dove ci porta, "Al commissariato per denunciarvi"... noi eravamo amici dei poliziotti del commissariato di quartiere, a cui avevamo anche prestato la carabina... glielo diciamo, lui risponde: "Ah si? Allora vi porto in un commissariato lontano, dove non conoscete nessuno!"... e cosi fece... ci venne a recuperare mio padre e la storia finì lì... ma ricordo come se fosse ieri il velo di terrore che calò sull'udienza di amici Italiani accorsi la sera stessa a casa nostra per consolarci e ascoltare il racconto della brutta vicenda: quando fra un singhiozzo e l'altro mio fratello disse "poi il Signor Casadei, perché cosi ha detto di chiamarsi..."... Casadei? Improvvisamente calò il gelo e dopo un breve incrocio di sguardi preoccupati, ognuno tornò a casa propria in fretta ed in silenzio...
La seconda volta fu altrettanto casualmente, a dicembre del 2002 quando, tornato a Maputo dopo 25 anni, mi ritrovai a cena a Villa Italia... il ristorante di Casadei... ma non lo sapevo... fu una sorpresa quando venne a fare il giro dei tavoli come ogni buon ristoratore ed arrivò al nostro, presentandosi: "Umberto Fusaroli Casadei, come trova i ravioli?"... sgranai gli occhi... era irriconoscibile, zoppicante, appesantito, col suo bastone... gli raccontai l'episodio della carabina, ovviamente non ricordava, si sedette al nostro tavolo, parlammo di politica, di Samora, della Frelimo, della Renamo... e mi raccontò per filo e per segno tutto quanto riporta qui sù Black_cat... Black_cat complimenti... un racconto preciso e fedele delle parole che ho sentito da Casadei... quello che manca però è che Casadei mi disse che era incastrato, che aveva già provato a rientrare in Italia... ma i fascisti (si, nel 2002 ancora parlava di "fascisti"), al suo primo tentativo di rientro in Italia, dopo anni di esilio, avevano subito provato ad ammazzarlo, con un pacco bomba, finito poi con lo scoppiare rocambolescamente nell'ape del postino... mi disse che gli anni di piombo in Italia non sono affatto finiti... che lui, rientrando in Italia, rischiava la vita e per quel motivo era dovuto ritornare di corsa a Maputo... solo che anche lì avevano tentato di fargli la pelle... mi fece vedere i buchi dei proiettili, gli avevano sparato ancora un paio di annetti prima a Maputo, nella strada del Polana, dietro il suo ristorante... mi disse che tanto sarebbe finito morto ammazzato e che stava lì lì per decidere di tornare in Italia, perché almano lì, lo avrebbero ammazzato in patria... ma ancora non si era deciso... parlammo fino a tardi, chiudemmo il ristorante... non credo alla tesi dell'incidente di macchina...


19 SETEMBRO 2007. MORTE DE CASADEI EM ACIDENTE DE VIAÇÃO EM ITÁLIA
"E' morto il Comandante Umberto Fusaroli Casadei". E' morto oggi in un incidente stradale il partigiano Umberto Fusaroli Casadei, commissario politico e comandante nell'8° Brigata Garibaldi di Romagna, poi guerrigliero in Mozambico. Per molti versi dimenticato dalla storia ufficiale, soprattutto quella di partito, perchè uomo scomodo, spero che la sua memoria non si spenga mai nei cuori di chi lo ha conosciuto e di chi come lui combatte ancora oggi i "mostri".

 Post subject: Re: A case of assassination?Posted: 2011.09.12. 15:25 
Nzhou wrote:
So whats your view on the air crash....accident or assassination?
CASSIUS (in http://www.newrhodesian.net/viewtopic.php?f=36&t=2383)
Well, if that question is directed to me, here is my view:
The Truth is out there, and I don't think it will ever come out.
No doubt the death of samora machel was "Welcome news" for South Africa. And for the Rhodesians too (although did not existed anymore). And for me too, because I had to flee from my birth country for the simple fact the colour of my skin is white.
The idea to get rid of samora, germinated in Mozambique itself. Frelimo was not sophisticated enough to pull something like this. And South Africa did not have proper connections inside Mozambique Frelimo structures. Overtime this connection got stronger (just) enough for Mozambican and South African agents to get together to plan and plot this incident.
While the Mozambicans and South Africans are holding discussions, the Russians/Cubans became aware of what is brewing. What a greater opportunity for the Russian/Cuban side to assassinate samora, and accuse South Africa. They are one step ahead and promote samora to the status of "Businessman" - making bricks 5 feet under.
Was the Russian/Cuban connection happy the way samora was flirting with South Africa? No.
Is there concrete evidence that S.A did? NO
Is there evidence that the idea was germinated by some members of the Frelimo structures? Yes, ask Mr.Casadei.
Is there evidence the Mozambicans did it? No
According to all evidence collected, it points out a lack of basic airmanship and incompetence. But I personally I'm not convinced about it alone. Yes, it shows a lack of basic airmanship and incompetence. But the web of deceit is so dense, it distorts the image of those from the other side - The Russian/Cuban connection.
My verdict: Assassination, and look east.
_________________
The Alterverse Of Willful Ignorance.
Let's face it. This isn't reality. It's a fleeting world of voluntary make believe only adopted by self-numbing drones too afraid to even ask questions any more.
And they do it willfully. We all do.


How Samora Machel signed his own death
10 JUL 1998 00:00 - STAFF REPORTER MAIL & GUARDIAN

There was motive for the then South African government to kill Mozambique’s Samora Machel, and there is plenty of evidence to back up these claims, writes Debora Patta (Radio 702, South Africa)

Robert Kirby’s article on the Samora Machel crash (June 19 to 25) is devoid of any context. He writes as if South Africa in 1986 was a perfectly normal society, with a judicial system above reproach and a defence force that would never stoop to dirty tricks. Those at the receiving end of apartheid’s evil deeds need no convincing as to what this country’s former rulers were capable of.

South Africa was perfectly capable of killing Mozambican president Samora Machel, and in fact had tried on several occasions to assassinate him. Furthermore, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was equipped with sophisticated beacon equipment that was part of its covert operations used during the Angolan war.

One has to ask why South Africa always hauled out Judge Cecil Margo whenever it needed to conduct a sensitive aviation inquiry. At the time of the crash, the SADF was under suspicion. The mere fact that Judge Margo was an honorary colonel with ties to the old South African Air Force was reason enough for him to excuse himself from the inquiry into the Machel crash. But during the apartheid days it was customary for the accused to investigate themselves.

Kirby dazzles and bamboozles readers with complicated, technical jargon. But he has only regurgitated the findings of a 12-year-old commission of inquiry that - at best - chose to ignore critical evidence.

What did the South Africans have to gain by killing Machel? Kirby argues that “with Samora Machel’s death South Africa was much diminished. We lost a neighbour of imagination, purpose and optimism. With the Nkomati Accord signed, a new chapter of co-operation had been opened. There was nothing to gain, even for the apartheid regime.”

In terms of the Nkomati Accord, the African National Congress was unceremoniously booted out of Mozambique and South Africa agreed to stop all military and logistical support for the rebel Mozambican group Renamo.

But history tells a different story. Machel had entered into a pact with the devil and signed what many would argue was his own death warrant.

The accord was a charade. South Africa had no intention of living up to it. Even as leaders of the two countries were shaking hands, supplies were being flown to Renamo. Pretoria was beefing up its Casa Banana base in Gorongosa. And when Casa Banana was captured by Frelimo a year after the accord, documents left behind showed that Machel had been cheated.

Supplies continued to be flown into the base, an airstrip had been built there and one of its most frequent visitors was South Africa’s deputy foreign minister Louis Nel.

South Africa also initiated Renamo operations out of bases in Malawi, which had become a focal point for destabilisation. Mozambican protests to Malawi culminated in a visit to Blantyre on September 11 1986 by Machel, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe.

In his book Machel of Mozambique Ian Christie writes: “When Machel set out on that trip he was angry. He detested [Malawi president Hastings] Banda and had on several occasions described him in my presence as a fascist.”

During a two-hour meeting, a furious Machel presented Banda with a dossier containing evidence of active support for Renamo by Malawi and South Africa. The documentation included a photocopy of a Malawian passport issued to Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama.
On his return to Maputo, Machel let off steam at a media conference where he told journalists: “We will place missiles along the border with Malawi if support to the bandits is not ended. And we will close the border to traffic between Malawi and South Africa going through Mozambique.” That was a serious threat: an average of 70 trucks a day were passing through Mozambique’s Tete province on the international route to the ports of South Africa.

Shortly after the meeting, Renamo launched a three-pronged conventional military invasion of Mozambique from Malawi. The invading military columns were led by white soldiers believed to be members of the South African Special Forces (reccies).

And that’s when Machel drove another nail into his coffin. During a visit to the province of Tete, which borders Malawi, he said: “The Malawian authorities have made their country a base for mercenaries of various nationalities, but principally South African soldiers. I think president Banda is not responsible. I think ministers, soldiers, members of the police and the Malawian security have been bought by the South Africans and other countries I don’t want to name now, although there is evidence of this.”

Machel was planning to fire several of his generals for profiting from the war with Renamo, but never lived to carry this out.

On October 6 1986, General Magnus Malan threatened Machel personally, following an alleged landmine explosion near the area where Machel’s plane would crash 13 days later.

“If president Machel chooses landmines, South Africa will react accordingly. If he allows a Moscow- inspired revolutionary war against South Africa, he must also be prepared to take responsibility. If he chooses terrorism and revolution, he will clash head on with South Africa,” warned the general.

The stage had been set for an attempt on Machel’s life, but as his widow Graça Machel has said: “We never expected South Africa to attack the presidential plane.”

And so it was on October 19, on a dark, still night in Mbuzini, a Tupolev 134 crashed into hilly terrain, killing Machel and 34 others. Only nine people survived the accident.

One of the first people on the scene of the crash site was a local resident who, fearing for his safety, will only give his name as Mike. Because he knew the area well and was able to negotiate the difficult mountainous terrain, he was taken to the scene of the crash by local police.

To his surprise, he found security police already on the scene. “The injured were crying and moaning, the plane wreckage was scattered all over. I was the only one who was a civilian.”

Nobody seemed particularly concerned about providing much-needed medical assistance, he says. Instead, police combed through wreckage, demanding that survivors tell them where Samora Machel was. “I don’t know what they told them, but they went back to the wreckage and came back with a briefcase and they put it on top of one of the car’s boots and started searching it. I knew if they found me I would be in big trouble because what they were doing was unlawful. They were not supposed to search the briefcase.”

The next day Mike was forced to go into hiding because SADF soldiers repeatedly visited his home looking for him.

A crash survivor, Machel’s chief bodyguard Fernando Manuel Joao, echoes Mike’s words. He had walked a considerable distance in search of help, and at midnight had managed to contact the Komatipoort police through the radio of a local religious mission.

When he returned to the crash site, he found that “the South Africans were not at all concerned with the lives of the wounded. They were just messing around with the other things there.” Joao was furious with the South Africans for “refusing to take the wounded to hospital.”
The then foreign affairs minister, Pik Botha, later admitted documents had been removed from the wreckage, providing details of a planned Mozambican strike against Malawi. Botha says: “Yes, technically that would have been a violation of diplomatic practice, certainly. But this was done probably to find out what was being discussed, but with respect this has nothing to do with the crash or the causes of the crash.”

Colonel Des Lynch was seconded from the South African Air Force to assist with the probe into the crash. For the record, he says he’s convinced the crash was caused by pilot error. But he has strong words about the way police and the Department of Foreign Affairs conducted themselves.

“From the first moment that the news was broken by the minister of foreign affairs on the SABC at 7am that led to confusion ... Even the minister ... who called impromptu press conferences, who leaked information to the press, made allegations about drunken behaviour and unserviceable equipment, things he knew very little about, only confused matters.”

To this day there are many people who believe the Russian crew on board the Tupolev 134 were drunk, although there was not a shred of evidence to support this. “Those allegations made an impact ... For a long time [they] contaminated the investigation,” he says.

Another bone of contention was the critical cockpit voice recording, known as the black box. On the day of the crash, civil aviation investigator Piet de Klerk handed the black box over to police for safekeeping. It would be nearly six weeks before he saw that crucial piece of evidence again. The black box was passed on to General Lothar Neethling, who headed the police forensic laboratory - and is shown, in original police footage of the accident, tramping through the wreckage.

In the days and weeks that followed the accident there was much political posturing between South Africa and the Soviet Union, until it was eventually agreed that accident investigators would fly to the Soviet Union to listen to the black box in the presence of their Russian counterparts.

But, says Lynch, literally days before they were due to fly to Moscow, police forensics were still refusing to part with the precious evidence. “We’d now got to the stage where we had to sue the police to give us the boxes back ... Not until lawyers’ letters were served on the police did they release the boxes.

“De Klerk ... described how he put [the boxes] in black plastic bags and sealed them and they were muddy and dirty and whatever - and the day that we arrived here they were spotless. There are little holes and things that are plugged with wax, and the wax was gone. We did not know whether they’d been opened or X-rayed and the more questions we put to the police the more obtuse they became. So we left here just hoping they would work and ... everything we got from the boxes was excellent.”

So we have a motive and a contaminated investigation. But let’s go one step further and look for a suspect, a modus operandi and a smoking gun. For that we travel to Italy to meet Umberto Fusaroli Casadei.

If you saw Casadei walking down the street, you would hardly give him a second glance. He looks like every other kindly old Italian man you find in the villages of Italy, who adores his grandchildren and passes the days hanging out at the local espresso bars or cheering for his favourite soccer team. But behind this apparent ordinariness is a remarkable story. He has rubbed shoulders with some of Africa’s greatest leaders and survived more than one assassination attempt.

Casadei was just 16 years old when he was forced to watch his father and two uncles being publicly executed by Franco Mussolini’s fascists during World War II in northern Italy. This scarred him for life, and he vowed then to fight oppression in every corner of the globe.

It was this that led him to Samora Machel, whom he fought with against the Portuguese colonialists. After independence he became one of Machel’s most trusted lieutenants, operating in the dangerous world of counter- espionage. Casadei was a double agent, pretending to work for South African military intelligence (MI) while secretly passing crucial information directly to Machel. He was paid R600 a month by South Africa for his false MI reports, money that ironically went straight into Mozambican government coffers.

One of his regular contacts was a female MI agent whom he has identified but asked that we call simply “Maureen”. It was during a routine meeting with Maureen that Casadei stumbled on the information that South African and Mozambican agents were plotting to kill Machel.

He described how “she asked me if the South Africans could trust the Mozambicans. Because they had asked the South Africans: if they assisted in killing Samora, what would the South Africans do to help those who’d assisted in the murder to take over power in Maputo?”

Now that he knew the identities of the Mozambican officials planning on betraying their leader, Casadei went straight to Machel and begged him to let him kill the two generals. “Samora now knew who was plotting against him, but he refused [to let] me kill them, he did not give me the permit to kill them. And so he gave them time to kill him. This was the big problem,” said Casadei, shaking his head regretfully.

It was not long after this that the crash occurred.

Devastated by the loss of one of his dearest friends, Casadei dedicated himself to investigating the cause of the crash. By 1994 he had collected enough information to go public with his story, speaking out in Mozambican radio interviews and newspaper articles. He linked top Mozambican and South African government officials to the conspiracy to kill Machel and provided critical technical information.

He paid a heavy price for his courage. Assassins opened fire on him on two occasions. The first time, convinced they’d killed him as he sat at the wheel of his Landrover, they taunted him by saying the bullets were a message from the Mozamibican generals he’d named as accomplices in the president’s murder. But he survived, driving himself, badly wounded, to hospital.

Several months later another round of bullets was emptied into Casadei’s body and again miraculously he survived. But by now things had become too dangerous, and this time he was forced to flee Mozambique and return to the town of his birth in Northern Italy.

Casadei’s story is reinforced by a foreign intelligence document from a neighbouring country in the possession of Radio 702. The document names the Malawian, Mozambican and South African agents who conspired in the plot to kill Machel. The Mozambicans named in the report are the very same ones who sent assassins to kill Casadei.

The document states that South Africa was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the technical aspects of the crash. Senior South African generals and a Cabinet minister are named in the report.

South African military intelligence was given the task of recruiting an airport official from Mozambique. According to the report, the airport official was paid a total of R1,5- million to assist the South Africans by switching off either the Maputo radar system or the beacon.

The report states that this person “travelled to Zimbabwe to close the deal with his foreign counterparts with the help of a Mozambican official who got him a medical certificate to justify his absence. Payments were made in two parts ... After the deal the Malawians and the South Africans started to monitor the control tower and the communications in it.”

(Radio 702 is in possession of the dates those payments were made and the banking institutions where the money was deposited. However, this could not be double-checked because the banks concerned do not keep records going that far back.)

The airport official would later ensure that the Maputo beacon and radar system was/were switched off, making it easier to operate a decoy beacon transmitting a signal on the same wavelength as the Maputo beacon.

The report states that on the night of the accident a decoy beacon was used to divert the plane off course.

The weather was extremely cloudy in Mbuzini that night, which provided optimum conditions for a decoy beacon to work successfully. The document also claims South African special forces were in Mbuzini on the night of the accident.

But the Margo inquiry found there was no evidence of SADF soldiers anywhere in Mbuzini on the night of the crash. Judge Margo was satisfied that “the SADF platoon commander in charge of the area from September to November 1986 was emphatic in his evidence that no SADF personnel were at the site”. What did Margo expect - that the SADF would readily admit it was in the area?

A former 32 batallion member who was on duty along another part of the border on the night of the Machel crash stumbled on the presence of soldiers in Mbuzini while he was monitoring his freqency-hopping radio.

That night, he said, “I was a member of special forces which was actively busy with another operation and using a C21 military radio. We heard pieces of messages coming through from 1 Reccie in the vicinity of the place where the plane went down of Samora Machel.” No mention was made over the radio of the nature of the special forces operation; the soldier said a blackout of information always meant it was a “black op” - a highly secret operation, details of which would only be known at a presidential and senior general level.

Another former national serviceman based at military headquarters in Pretoria has come forward to say on the night of the crash he was told he had to work late. His job was to provide refreshments for the military top brass, led by General Joubert. “He was there, [General] Kat Liebenberg arrived, Magnus Malan arrived. It was unusual because we had to work late and take refreshments up to them. These guys had an appetite, they were hungry,” said the national serviceman, who has asked that his name be kept out of this report.

Also there that night was former electronic warfare head Lieutenant- Colonel Mossie Basson. He has confirmed the presence of Joubert, and says by some strange coincidence there was a secret operation under way that night. However, he says it had nothing to do with the Machel plane crash.

The South African Air Force has admitted it was tracking the Russian aircraft on its radar system that night, and saw the plane making a wrong turn. One has to wonder why it never bothered to communicate with an enemy plane heading for South African territory. Surely the obvious thing to have done was to point out that the Russian plane had made a wrong turn and warn the pilot he was about to encroach on South African airspace.

The Renamo and special forces link is given weight by another piece of evidence from former Renamo operative Paulo de Oliveira,who was based in Lisbon at the time. He was the man South African military officials in Phalaborwa would radio whenever they needed Renamo to claim responsibility for operations executed by South African special forces.

Several days before the crash, De Oliveira’s South African military contact in Phalaborwa sent him an urgent message: “Pay attention to the news and stay near the telephone and so on, because something big is going to happen.” That was two or three days before the crash.

Several hours after the crash, De Oliveira received further orders telling him to remain on standby as “Renamo might have to claim responsibility for shooting down Machel’s plane”. By midday that instruction had been withdrawn and the accident was never spoken about again.

De Oliveira handed himself over to Frelimo in 1988, and he provided details of South Africa’s ongoing support for Renamo long after the Nkomati Accord had been signed.

A senior military colonel now retired from the army has confirmed there were also members of the signal intelligence division (Sigid) in Mbuzini on the night of the crash. He describes a Landrover that he says was in the area over the period of the crash, under the command of Sigid. Inside the vehicle was sophisticated electronic equipment used to unscramble frequencies, monitor signals, etc. Residents in Mbuzini spoke of seeing a Landrover in Mbuzini at the time of the crash.

A former national serviceman in the air force working at Snake Valley 4AD says in the weeks preceding the Machel crash he saw a beacon being built. He describes a piece of equipment powered by a Kawasaki motor, mounted on a small trolley with a klerkmast attached to it. When he asked why it was being built, he was told: “It’s a secret operation that has nothing to do with you.” It disappeared over the weekend of the crash.

Compare these descriptions of communications systems contained inside a Landrover and an electronic device mounted on a small trolley to the technical information provided in the Mozambican report attached to the Margo inquiry.

A British-based VOR manufacturer states that transmitting a false signal that mimics the Maputo beacon is “a simple task and an effective method of boosting the output of the required radials from a given power source. It could be readily accomplished with a vehicle-mounted unit using two standard motor-vehicle batteries in series as a 24-volt supply and a directional horizontally polarised antenna ...The simplest and most effective way to produce accurate radials would be to switch off the Maputo DVOR during the period any mobile decoy VOR was activated.”

Kirby dismisses this technical information contained in the Mozambican appendix to the Margo report and casts aspersions on the source of the information, stating it was “acquired from an un-named British VOR manufacturer”.

One wonders if Kirby actually bothered to read the full Margo report. It clearly states in a letter from Mr R Chippendale, an accident investigator from New Zealand, that the information is gathered from Bill Eastwood, the technical director of the reputable London-based Racal Avionics, and his associate, Ron Hazel. Both letters are signed by the two men and their full addresses are supplied. Racal Avionics was the manufacturer of the Maputo VOR and well acquainted with the product in question.

Both Casadei’s allegations and the intelligence documents indicate the Maputo beacon was indeed switched off.

According to Casadei, ground-control staff were removed from their posts shortly before the plane was due to land, the radar was not working and it’s possible that the Maputo beacon was also switched off. If the Maputo beacon and/or the radar was switched off and the crew deliberately confused during descent, said Casadei, optimum conditions would have been provided for a decoy beacon to be used to lure the plane off course.

The Russian Civil Aviation report backs up the theory of a decoy beacon. It provides a body of technical information arrogantly rejected by the Margo inquiry. It is also dismissed in a couple of sentences by Kirby, who seems to fall into the old “reds under the bed” trap that portrays Russian pilots as stupid and their inquiry as nothing more than communist propaganda.

The Margo inquiry blamed the Machel crash on pilot error. A key aspect of the Russian investigation is documented evidence that another plane flying along the same route as the Tupolev intercepted the signal of a false beacon.

The report states: “Pilots of the commercial aircraft Boeing 737-200 C9BAA of the LAM airline stated that the board navigation equipment on their aircraft picked up the Maputo beacon unusually early ... The same signal of the false VOR was received by the board equipment on the Boeing 737 aircraft of the LAM airline.”

This evidence is not conclusive, but it casts sufficient doubt on Margo’s findings to call for a new inquiry. It also raises questions about the failure of the commission to adequately probe key issues like the presence of the military in Mbuzini.

Certainly there is no doubt that the crew of the Tupolev 134 made some serious errors, most notably when they ignored the ground warning signal shortly before impact. But by then it was too late. At that stage they believed they were landing at Maputo airport, even though it was pitch black. These pilots, who had thousands of miles of flying experience, were used to landing in darkness, as the electricity at the airport was frequently switched off by the South Africans.

Even if the crew had realised that they had made a wrong turn, I am convinced they had no chance of surviving. There is strong evidence to suggest the presence of highly trained special force members in the area. If the plane did not crash, the military would always have had a plan B and be prepared for every contingency. Perhaps they were waiting to shoot down the plane if the decoy-beacon plan failed.
But the plane crashed in South African territory and South Africa was then able to control the accident investigation .

(1998) Debora Patta is the news and special assignments editor of Radio 702 and Cape Talk. She has been investigating the Samora Machel crash for the past 10 months, and this report is a compilation of special reports broadcast on 702 and Cape Talk from October last year